The creation of electronic summary patient records which can readily be accessed by medical teams on the NHS broadband computer system, known as the Spine, is one which has met with approval in many quarters. This is unsurprising given the potential health benefits resulting from clinicians being able to access such records. However, this approval has been tempered by concerns that the NHS, in common with other large-scale public authorities, may not be able to maintain appropriate levels of security with respect to this manifestly sensitive personal data. Yesterday the Guardian reported that, following talks between the ICO and Connecting for Health (CfH), the agency responsible for implementing the records scheme, CfH has now yielded to calls for NHS patients be given the right to have their summary care records deleted from the system (although deletion would not occur if the records had already been used, in which case they would be archived for medic-legal reasons). The right to have records deleted will be additional to the right already granted to patients to opt out of the scheme before a record is created for them. CfH’s decision to permit patients to have their record deleted represents a move away from earlier proposals that, where objections were made, the record would simply be ‘masked’ within the system. Notably, the news over changes to the care records scheme comes only days after it was revealed that records revealing personal data relating to tens of thousands of MOD personnel, which were lost last year, had contained not merely financial information but also highly sensitive vetting information. The revelations have been controversial because, whilst the loss was announced last year, neither Parliament nor the ICO were informed that the lost data included sensitive vetting data.
ABORTION STATISTICS AND PERSONAL DATA
May 27th, 2009 by Anya Proops
The Information Tribunal will this week begin hearing an important appeal against a decision of the Information Commissioner that certain abortion statistics relating to ground (e) abortions (abortions in cases of disability) were disclosable under section 1 FOIA. The appeal concerns in particular the interesting and difficult question of whether and to what extent ostensibly anonymous, statistical information can nonetheless constitute ‘personal data’ for the purposes of the personal data exemption provided for under section 40 FOIA. Before the Commissioner, the DH argued that, whilst the information in the abortion statistics does not per se identify any particular individual, because the statistics themselves relate to a relatively small number of cases, it would still be possible to identify particular patients and/or doctors who have carried out the abortions, particularly if the statistics were married either with other information held by the DH or already in the public domain. The Commissioner was not persuaded by that argument. He held that the statistical information was so far removed from the information on the Abortion Notification forms from which the information was derived that it no longer retained the attributes of personal data. The proposition that proximity to identifying information should be the barometer of whether particular anonymous information constitutes ‘personal data’ is likely to be hotly contested before the Tribunal. Watch this space for further news! Tim Pitt-Payne will be appearing on behalf of the Commissioner.
Privacy and the Police – Important Court of Appeal Judgment
May 22nd, 2009 by Anya Proops
By a two to one majority, the Court of Appeal decided yesterday, in Wood v Commissioner for Police of the Metropolis [2009] EWCA Civ 414, that the Metropolitan Police had acted unlawfully when it retained photographs which it had taken of an anti-arms trade campaigner as he was leaving the AGM of Reed Elsevier Plc (“REP”). This is an important judgment on the scope of the Article 8(1) right to privacy and on the scope of the justification defence available under Article 8(2).
The facts – REP is the parent company of a company which organises trade fairs for the arms industry, Spearhead Exhibitions Limited. As a result of its association with Spearhead, REP’s offices have been subject to demonstrations, some involving criminal damage. In April 2005, Mr Wood attended REP’s AGM at the Millenium hotel in London in his capacity as shareholder. At the time, Mr Wood was a media co-ordinator for Campaign Against the Arms Trade (“CAAT”). It was not in dispute that Mr Wood was of good character, had no criminal convictions and had never been arrested. Moreover, his behaviour at the AGM had been entirely unobjectionable. However, as he was leaving the hotel, Mr Wood was overtly photographed by a photographer acting on behalf of the police. He was then questioned by police but declined to confirm his identity or answer their questions. The police claimed that, upon leaving the AGM, Mr Wood had been joined by a former member of CAAT with a history of unlawful activity against organisations involved in the arms industry. That assertion was disputed by Mr Wood. The police also claimed that it had taken the photographs in order to be able to identify offenders if offences were or had been committed at the AGM or if they were subsequently committed at the arms fair.
The High Court judgment – The High Court dismissed Mr Wood’s judicial review claim that the police’s actions had breached his Article 8 right to privacy. It did so on the basis that the police’s actions had not interfered with Mr Wood’s Article 8(1) right to private life (Wood v Commissioner of the Police for the Metropolis [2008] EWHC 1105 (Admin)).
The Court of Appeal judgment – The Court of appeal disagreed with the High Court’s conclusion that there was no interference with Mr Wood’s Article 8(1) right to privacy. It held that the mere taking of photographs in a public place was not itself capable of engaging Article 8. However, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, Mr Wood’s Article 8 right to privacy had been interfered with. In particular, this was so because the photographs had been taken by an organ of the State, the police action was unexplained at the time it happened and, further, it carried with it the implication that the images would be kept and used in the future. On the question of whether the police was able to establish that interference was justified, and hence lawful under Article 8(2), the Court of Appeal unanimously agreed that the taking and retention of photographs of Mr Wood pursued legitimate aims, namely the prevention of disorder or crime and in the interests of public safety or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. However, they disagreed on the question of whether the measures used by the police to pursue those legitimate aims were proportionate in all the circumstances. The majority (Lord Collins and Dyson LJ) held that, whereas retaining the photographs for a few days after the meeting was permissible, once it had become clear that Mr Wood had not committed any offence at the meeting, it was unreasonable and, hence, disproportionate for the photographs to be retained pending the trade fair. This was because there was no reasonable basis in the circumstances for fearing that Mr Wood might commit an offence at the trade fair. It is apparent from Lord Collins’ judgment that he was particularly concerned as to the potential ‘chilling effect’ which similar police actions would have on future potentially peaceful campaigners (see paragraph 92). Laws LJ dissented on the question of whether the interference was proportionate. He held that the interference was not disproportionate particularly because: ‘The taking of the pictures was in no sense aggressively done. The retention of the pictures was carefully and tightly controlled. The appellant’s image was not placed on any searchable database, far less a nationwide database indefinitely retained. But for the commencement of these proceedings the images of the appellant would have been destroyed after the DSEi exhibition’ (paragraph 58). The judges did however agree that the instant case was wholly distinguishable from Marper (ECtHR decides retention policy in respect of police DNA database gave rise to unjustified interferences with right to privacy – see my earlier post on the Home Office response to Marper and also Tim Pitt Payne’s NLJ article on the judgment itself).
It is important to note that the result of the Court of Appeal’s judgment is that the taking of the photographs did not per se constitute a unlawful interference with Mr Wood’s right to privacy. Rather what was unlawful was the excessive retention of the photographs beyond a time when there was any reasonable basis for supposing that Mr Wood may engage in criminal conduct at the arms fair. On the question of whether this judgment sets a precedent on the question of whether the police can generally take photographs of ostensibly law-abiding citizens, it is worth noting Lord Collins’ concluding comments: ‘it is plain that the last word has yet to be said on the implications for civil liberties on the taking and retention of images in the modern surveillance society. This is not the case for the exploration of the wider, and very serious, human rights issues which arise when the State obtains and retains the images of persons who have committed no offence and are not suspected of having committed any offence’ (paragraph 100).
CCTV In the Dock
May 18th, 2009 by Anya Proops
DNA Database – The Age of Innocence
May 7th, 2009 by Anya Proops
The Government has today proposed new rules for the retention of DNA profiles and fingerprints on the police national DNA database. The proposals, which are made in the context of a public consultation process (‘Keeping the Right People on the DNA Database’), come in the wake of the Marper judgment (4 December 2008). In Marper, the ECtHR held that a blanket policy under which fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles were indefinitely retained by the police constituted a disproportionate and, hence, unlawful interference with Article 8 rights to privacy. The new proposed rules aim to circumvent the problems posed by having a blanket indefinite retention policy by varying the length of time that data can be retained depending in the innocence of the suspect and the severity of the crime in respect of which they were arrested. Thus, the DNA profiles and fingerprints of individuals who are arrested but not convicted in respect of minor offences will be destroyed after a period of six years; individuals who are arrested but not convicted for more serious violent and sexual offences and terrorism-related offences will have to wait twelve years for their DNA profiles and fingerprints to be destroyed; individuals who are convicted of an imprisonable offence will have their DNA profiles and fingerprints retained indefinitely. The proposals have received a rebarbative response from civil liberties campaigners, many of whom had expected the Government to destroy some 850,000 DNA profiles, fingerprints and samples in response to the Marper judgment. Of course, the question has to be posed whether it can ever be a proportionate interference with privacy rights to retain data in respect of individuals whose guilt was never established in respect of the offence for which they were arrested and who must, in the circumstances, be deemed innocent. The Government’s answer to this question appears to be that the interference is justified because: (a) criminology research suggests that, over time, the retained data can be used to convict those ostensibly innocent individuals of subsequent crimes; and (b) accordingly, retention of the data will constitute a vital weapon in the fight against crime. The presumption underlying this answer appears to be that, in a statistically significant number of cases, individuals who appear to be innocent in respect of one crime are in fact destined to go on to commit crimes in the future, such that it is legitimate for their data to be retained for a relatively substantial period of time (either six or twelve years). Whilst the more nuanced approach to the retention of DNA profiles may be relatively well placed to survive a legal challenge in the domestic courts (see further the House of Lords judgment in Marper [2004] UKHL 39, [2004] 1 WLR 2196), it remains to be seen whether the ECtHR would regard that approach as falling within the four corners of the justification defence under Article 8(2).
ID Card Trials Struggle on Take Off
May 5th, 2009 by Anya ProopsRecent media reports suggest that the British Airline Pilots’ Association (Balpa), which represents more than 80% of commercial airline pilots, is considering a legal challenge to Home Office plans to use critical airside workers as the first compulsory guinea pigs in trials of the national identity card scheme. MPs are shortly to be asked to approve powers which could be used to compel pilots and other individuals who work airside to register for the national ID card scheme as part of their pre-employment checks. Balpa, which has been objecting to the proposed trial arrangements since late 2008, has raised concerns about the compulsory nature of the current proposed arrangements. It has also asserted that ID cards will have absolutely no value so far as security is concerned. Meanwhile, speculation that the Government may look to axe the ID card scheme in the wake of the economic downturn has been dampened by an announcement in early April 2009 that the Government had recently signed two ten year contracts worth £650 million to get the scheme under way.
GCHQ Denies Snooping Project
May 5th, 2009 by Anya ProopsGCHQ, one of the three UK intelligence agencies, has issued a public statement in which it has specifically denied that it is developing technology which would enable it to access all internet traffic in the UK. The statement, which was made in response to weekend media reports on GCHQ’s Mastering the Internet Programme (MTI), is unusual in that the agency does not usually comment on media stories. The statement is plainly designed to reassure the public than the State is not secretly sanctioning the development of highly intrusive surveillance strategies. Its release follows in the wake of an announcement made by the Home Secretary on 27 April 2009 that the government had shelved plans to create a superdatabase that would centrally store all communications data in Britain (see the earlier post on the Super Database).
Police DNA Database Cut Down to Size
May 4th, 2009 by Anya ProopsThe Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith, will this week unveil plans to remove from the police national database DNA information relating to up to one million innocent people. The proposals come in the wake of the ECtHR’s judgment in Marper in December 2008 that the practice of retaining the DNA profiles of innocent people on the database constituted an unjustified interference with the Article 8 right to privacy. Privacy campaigners have welcomed this development but continue to lobby for further limitations on the database, including removing the DNA profiles for minor offenders. See further Tim Pitt-Payne’s article on the Marper judgment in the New Law Journal.
Super Database – Not so Super After All
April 29th, 2009 by Anya ProopsThe Home Secretary has this week announced that proposals to create a State run super database, which would track everyone’s use of email, internet and text messages, have been scrapped. The announcement is hardly surprising. It was always going to be difficult to persuade the public that such a database could be kept secure, particularly in light of recent high profile controversies about large scale losses of electronic personal data by government agencies. Moreover, allowing the State to develop such a vast single repository of electronic communications data was always going to raise questions as to whether the resulting interference with private rights was proportionate and was otherwise consistent with the State’s obligations under the Data Protection Act 1998. The Government has now issued a consultation paper on new plans to allow telecommunications companies to retain the communications data for a period of 12 months. See further the Home Secretary’s Ministerial Statement.
Rethinking RIPA
April 20th, 2009 by Anya ProopsOn 17 April 2009, the Home Office launched a consultation on plans to stop investigatory powers being used under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) for trivial purposes. It seeks views on questions including: which public authorities should be able to authorise key investigatory techniques, for example, the use of communications data or covert surveillance in public places under RIPA; the purposes for which these investigatory techniques should be used; the option of raising the rank of the local authority employee authorising the use of investigatory techniques to senior executive; and whether elected councillors should play a role in the authorisation. The consultation follows on from a spate of public outcrys about the use of surveillance powers by public authorities, including not least the use of covert cameras by local authorities to watch how residents use their rubbish bins and the use of covert surveillance techniques to track a family which the local authority suspected may be living outside the local school catchment area. The issue of how the investigatory powers available under RIPA should be used is particularly current in view of the recent controversy over techniques used by the police to photograph protesters, many of whom it is argued are merely peaceful demonstrators.