Our earlier post about the blacklisting story in the Guardian continues to attract attention.
The article was by freelance journalist Phil Chamberlain; and his blog here gives a lot background information – including a photograph of the notorious database . Phil has been following the story for about 18 months.
The last Queen’s speech before the election includes another proposal for databases about children; this time, in relation to children who are being home educated.
The background is that in January 2009 the Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF) commissioned Graham Badman to carry out a review of the current system for supporting and monitoring home education. The report (available here) was published in June 2009. Its first recommendation was that the DCSF should establish a national registration scheme, locally administered, for all children of statutory school age who are, or become, home educated.
On 11th June the Government launched a consultation about registration and monitoring proposals for home education. Unfortunately I cannot link to the consultation document itself, as it is currently unavailable on the DCSF website. The key proposals in the consultation document were these.
There are four points to make about this. One is that the proposed registers are, in substance, a mechanism for parents to seek advance permission from their local authority before home schooling their children. Failure to register will not in itself be a criminal offence, but may lead to a school attendance order; and failure to comply with that order may be a criminal offence. Secondly, exactly what information is to be included in each register is unclear, and will be set out in regulations; but it may well be that the registers will include information about each child’s prospective home education, as well as basic personal details such as name and address. Thirdly, it is unclear as yet who will have access to these registers, and for what purpose. And fourthly, there are to be specific information-sharing provisions in connection with home education.
One of our readers raised a question arising out of the previous post on employment blacklists.
According to this report on the BBC website, Steve Acheson (who was on the blacklist) was the subject of an unsuccessful attempt by his former employer to obtain an injunction to prevent him from protesting against his dismissal. Apparently the application was made under anti-terrorism legislation. Our reader asks if we can throw any light on the legal basis for the application.
Unfortunately the answer is no; it appears that there is no report of the case online in any of the usual places. The best I can find is this item from the website of Mr. Acheson’s solicitors.
We haven’t enabled the comments function on the blog. But you are very welcome to send any feedback to Lucy.Miller@11kbw.com. We are always delighted to see that people are reading and responding.
In March this year the Information Commissioner took enforcement action against the Consulting Association, which had been operating a secret blacklist of employees in the construction industry, including details of trade union activity. We posted about this story here, earlier this year.
Today, the Guardian has extensive coverage of what has happened since.
The Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform has now consulted on draft regulations under section 3 of the Employment Relations Act 1999. The consultation ended on 18th August 2009. The proposed regulations are intended to outlaw the compilation, dissemination and use of blacklists of trade unionists. They would make it unlawful to refuse employment, or to dismiss employees or subject them to a detriment, for reasons related to a prohibited blacklist. Individuals who suffer loss through blacklisting would be able to bring claims either in the Employment Tribunal or in the civil courts, depending on the nature of their complaint.
The trade union UCATT commissioned a report from the Institute of Employment Rights about the proposed regulations. The report, by Professor Keith Ewing, was published on 15th September 2009: it is entitled “Ruined Lives”, and deals specifically with blacklisting in the construction industry. It includes sample material from Consulting Association files. The report gives a fascinating history of the practice of blacklisting, going back to the late 19th century. It suggests a number of changes to the draft Regulations, including: that keeping or using a blacklist, or supplying information to it, should be a criminal offence; and that there should be a right to compensation for the fact of being included on a blacklist, even if the inclusion does not lead to any loss.
A further point to note about the draft Regulations is that they deal specifically with the blacklisting of trade unionists (as does section 3 of the 1999 Act). So they would not assist individuals who had been blacklisted for other reasons; e.g. because of their political beliefs and affiliations, or because they have a history of raising concerns about health and safety issues.
A number of individuals have brought employment tribunal claims arising out of alleged blacklisting. The claims have been consolidated and there will be a case management discussion in Manchester ET on 24th November 2009. This blog gives further information.
Meanwhile the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) has taken control of the Consulting Association database. Individuals who think that they may have been blacklisted can contact the ICO; for more information, see this page of the ICO’s website.
Yesterday, the High Court handed down a controversial judgment on the use of ‘the closed material procedure’ (CMP) in civil litigation: Al-Rawi & Ors v The Security Service & Ors (judge – Silber J). The background to the judgment is that a number of individuals who had been detained at Guantanamo Bay had brought claims for damages against the defendants on the basis that they had caused or contributed to the claimants’ unlawful detention and ill-treatment by foreign governments. A preliminary issue then arose in these cases as to whether the defendants could put evidence before the court using the CMP. The CMP, in effect, allows defendants to put documents in evidence before the court whilst at the same time withholding them from the claimants. The only way in which the claimants have any say on the closed material is through the use of special advocates appointed to act on their behalf. However, the role of special advocates is heavily circumscribed, not least because they cannot convey to their clients the content of the closed material.
The CMP has formerly been used in the context of deportation appeals heard by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC). However, the CMP has not previously been a feature of civil litigation. Instead, in the context of civil litigation, if the government was concerned that the disclosure of particular information would be contrary to the public interest, the best it could hope for was to rely on the public interest immunity (PII) procedure. The crucial difference between the PII procedure and the CMP is that the former procedure operates so as to ensure that the PII material is not put before the court at all, whereas the latter procedure allows the government to put the closed material before the judge whilst at the same time not disclosing that material to the other side. Thus, there is an inherent asymmetry present in the CMP which is not present in the PII procedure.
In a controversial judgment, Silber J decided as a preliminary issue that use of the CMP was permissible in a civil claim for damages, albeit only in exceptional cases. In reaching this conclusion, Silber J rejected arguments that the High Court had no jurisdiction to permit the use of the CMP; that use of the CMP was inconsistent with the requirements of the CPR and that it was otherwise at odds with the established PII procedure. It is highly likely that this judgment will go on appeal. 11KBW’s Karen Steyn acted on behalf of the defendants.
When the new monetary penalties regime under sections 55A-E of the DPA comes fully into force, the Information Commissioner will have power to impose a civil penalty on a data controller for a serious contravention of any of the data protection principles if – in essence – the contravention is (1) deliberate or reckless and (2) of a kind likely to cause substantial damage or distress.
The Ministry of Justice is currently consulting on what the maximum penalty under section 55A should be. £500,000 is proposed. Whilst this is clearly not an insubstantial sum, it needs to be compared with the fact that many other regulators have power to impose a penalty of up to 10% of an organisation’s turnover. If the data controller at issue has a turnover that is significantly above £5m, and – for example – a serious contravention has caused damage or distress to a very large number of people, the maximum penalty of £500,000 may begin to look a little on the small side. Indeed, the Commissioner may not even be able to go that far: the ICO’s draft guidance on the monetary penalty powers indicates at paragraph 7.4 that swift payment of the penalty will lead to a 20% reduction. So a data controller that decides not to contest the penalty may end up only paying a maximum of £400,000.
One final point. The penalties are to be paid into the consolidated fund (section 55A(8)). Thus, where the data controller is a central government body, the imposition of any size of penalty will have a slightly unreal quality to it, as the sum involved will simply return to the financial pot from which the body in question drew its funding in the first place.
We call them “data protection duck outs”. The New Zealanders call them “BOTPAs” (standing for “Because of the Privacy Act”). Organisations do something silly, and then blame it on data protection legislation.
There’s a nice recent example. A parcel was addressed to a 9 day old baby. Initially the Royal Mail wouldn’t deliver it to her grandfather, apparently because the Data Protection Act required the baby to sign for it personally. Not surprisingly, the ICO has confirmed that the Act does not require anything of the kind.
On 17 November 2009, the Supreme Court will hear the Information Commissioner’s appeal against the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Office of Communications v Information Commissioner [2009] EWCA Civ 90 (Ofcom). In Ofcom, the Court of Appeal held that, when multiple exceptions were engaged in respect of particular information, the public interest test provided for under regulation 12(1)(b) of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 would operate so as to entitle the public authority to aggregate all the different public interest factors relating to all applicable exceptions in a single, compendious public interest balancing exercise. This judgment was controversial, not least because it represented a departure from the well-established approach of tailoring public interest considerations to the individual exception in issue. Notably, in a recent Information Tribunal decision, the Tribunal highlighted some of the practical difficulties posed by the adoption of the aggregate approach to the public interest test (South Gloucestershire v Information Commissioner (EA/2009/0032), §§48-52). 11KBW’s Clive Lewis and Akhlaq Choudhury will be appearing on behalf of the Commissioner in the Supreme Court.
