Blogger’s Identity Not Private Information

June 17th, 2009 by Anya Proops

Yesterday, the High Court handed down an important judgment on the application of the law of privacy to anonymous bloggers. The case involved a detective constable, Mr Horton, whose anonymous blog, ‘Night Jack’, gave a behind-the-scenes insight into modern policing. The prize-winning blog attracted a huge following. When a journalist at the time discovered Mr Horton’s identity by carrying out his own detective work, Mr Horton sought and was granted an injunction restraining the Times from revealing his identity. However, that injunction was lifted in a judgment handed down on 16 June 2009 by Eady J: The Author of a Blog v Times Newspapers Ltd [2009] EWHC 1358 (QB).

 

The central issue in the case was whether the developing law of privacy entitled Mr Horton to retain anonymity in respect of the blog. Eady J held that the injunction should be lifted because Mr Horton had failed to demonstrate that there was a legally enforceable right to maintain anonymity in respect of his identity. In reaching this conclusion, Eady J applied a two stage test: first, he considered whether Mr Horton had established that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of his blogging activities; second, he considered whether, if there was a reasonable expectation of privacy, that expectation was nonetheless overridden by the public interest in disclosure.  Eady J found that Mr Horton lost on the first limb of the test because the essentially public nature of his blogging activity meant that, judged objectively, Mr Horton could not reasonably expect that his identity would be treated as private information. Having decided the case against Mr Horton on this basis, Eady J nonetheless went on to consider the public interest arguments. With respect to those arguments, he held that there was in any event an overwhelming public interest in disclosure of the information. This was the case particularly given the public interest in revealing that the person making critical and politically controversial comments about the force through the blog was himself a particular serving police officer. In reaching these conclusions, Eady J rejected arguments to the effect that the injunction should be maintained given the risk that disclosure of his identity would increase the risk that Mr Horton would face disciplinary action.

High Court Judgment on Inspection of Personal Data

May 29th, 2009 by Anya Proops

The High Court has recently handed down an interesting judgment on the extent to which redacted personal data contained in documents disclosed in the course of litigation was vulnerable to inspection. The judgment also highlights some of the limits which may be placed on parties seeking inspection of databases containing personal data. In Webster & Ors v Ridgeway Foundation School Governors [2009] EWHC 1140 (QB), the claimants had brought claims against the governors of a school on the basis that they had suffered racially motivated assaults on school property. They alleged that the governors had caused or contributed to the injury by negligently failing to maintain proper disciplinary standards or otherwise taking proper care with respect to pupil security, particularly by allowing racial tensions to develop. During the course of standard disclosure, the governors disclosed a log of investigations into racist incidents, bullying and aggression in the school. Moreover, one of their witness statements disclosed the existence of a computerized system used to record pupil behaviour. The governors allowed inspection of the disclosed documents but redacted the names of purported victims of racism, bullying and aggression. The claimants sought disclosure of the redacted names and, further, of the computerized system. They argued that they needed to access this information in order to assess whether there were other pupils who might be able to provide useful evidence and that they had a right to inspect that information given that its existence had been disclosed by the governors.

Nicol J refused the claimants’ application for inspection of the redacted information and the computerized system. He held that that the mere fact that a document had been disclosed did not mean that there was an automatic right of inspection in respect of all of the information it contained, not least this was because some of the information in the disclosed document may not be relevant to the matters in issue. On the facts of the instant case, Nicol J found that inspection of the redacted names could and should be refused on the basis that: (a) it would amount to an interference with the privacy rights of the individual children named in the documents; and (b) that interference was not necessary in the instant case as the claimants did not need to know the identities of the purported victims in order to have a fair trial or for the fair disposal of the litigation (Science Research Council v Nasse [1980] AC 1028 HL applied). With respect to the computerized system, Nicol J accepted that mention of a document in a witness statement could be equated with inclusion of a document in a disclosure list and, hence, prima facie it would give rise to an obligation to permit inspection. However, he also held that that general proposition was subject to the qualifications contained in CPR 31.3, which included the right to object to disclosure on grounds of proportionality. Nicol J went on to find that permitting inspection of the computerized database would be disproportionate, particularly because: (a) the governors would have to redact the entire database to ensure that any private information relating to individual pupils and, further, any irrelevant information was not disclosed, which was a very substantial task and (b) undertaking this task was disproportionate having regard to any possible benefit for the claimants and the issues in the case. 

Privacy and the Police – Important Court of Appeal Judgment

May 22nd, 2009 by Anya Proops

By a two to one majority, the Court of Appeal decided yesterday, in Wood v Commissioner for Police of the Metropolis [2009] EWCA Civ 414, that the Metropolitan Police had acted unlawfully when it retained photographs which it had taken of an anti-arms trade campaigner as he was leaving the AGM of Reed Elsevier Plc (“REP”). This is an important judgment on the scope of the Article 8(1) right to privacy and on the scope of the justification defence available under Article 8(2).

The factsREP is the parent company of a company which organises trade fairs for the arms industry, Spearhead Exhibitions Limited. As a result of its association with Spearhead, REP’s offices have been subject to demonstrations, some involving criminal damage. In April 2005, Mr Wood attended REP’s AGM at the Millenium hotel in London in his capacity as shareholder. At the time, Mr Wood was a media co-ordinator for Campaign Against the Arms Trade (“CAAT”). It was not in dispute that Mr Wood was of good character, had no criminal convictions and had never been arrested. Moreover, his behaviour at the AGM had been entirely unobjectionable. However, as he was leaving the hotel, Mr Wood was overtly photographed by a photographer acting on behalf of the police. He was then questioned by police but declined to confirm his identity or answer their questions. The police claimed that, upon leaving the AGM, Mr Wood had been joined by a former member of CAAT with a history of unlawful activity against organisations involved in the arms industry. That assertion was disputed by Mr Wood. The police also claimed that it had taken the photographs in order to be able to identify offenders if offences were or had been committed at the AGM or if they were subsequently committed at the arms fair.

The High Court judgment The High Court dismissed Mr Wood’s judicial review claim that the police’s actions had breached his Article 8 right to privacy. It did so on the basis that the police’s actions had not interfered with Mr Wood’s Article 8(1) right to private life (Wood v Commissioner of the Police for the Metropolis [2008] EWHC 1105 (Admin)).

The Court of Appeal judgment The Court of appeal disagreed with the High Court’s conclusion that there was no interference with Mr Wood’s Article 8(1) right to privacy. It held that the mere taking of photographs in a public place was not itself capable of engaging Article 8. However, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, Mr Wood’s Article 8 right to privacy had been interfered with. In particular, this was so because the photographs had been taken by an organ of the State, the police action was unexplained at the time it happened and, further, it carried with it the implication that the images would be kept and used in the future. On the question of whether the police was able to establish that interference was justified, and hence lawful under Article 8(2), the Court of Appeal unanimously agreed that the taking and retention of photographs of Mr Wood pursued legitimate aims, namely the prevention of disorder or crime and in the interests of public safety or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. However, they disagreed on the question of whether the measures used by the police to pursue those legitimate aims were proportionate in all the circumstances. The majority (Lord Collins and Dyson LJ) held that, whereas retaining the photographs for a few days after the meeting was permissible, once it had become clear that Mr Wood had not committed any offence at the meeting, it was unreasonable and, hence, disproportionate for the photographs to be retained pending the trade fair. This was because there was no reasonable basis in the circumstances for fearing that Mr Wood might commit an offence at the trade fair. It is apparent from Lord Collins’ judgment that he was particularly concerned as to the potential ‘chilling effect’ which similar police actions would have on future potentially peaceful campaigners (see paragraph 92). Laws LJ dissented on the question of whether the interference was proportionate. He held that the interference was not disproportionate particularly because: ‘The taking of the pictures was in no sense aggressively done. The retention of the pictures was carefully and tightly controlled. The appellant’s image was not placed on any searchable database, far less a nationwide database indefinitely retained. But for the commencement of these proceedings the images of the appellant would have been destroyed after the DSEi exhibition’ (paragraph 58). The judges did however agree that the instant case was wholly distinguishable from Marper (ECtHR decides retention policy in respect of police DNA database gave rise to unjustified interferences with right to privacy – see my earlier post on the Home Office response to Marper and also Tim Pitt Payne’s NLJ article on the judgment itself).

It is important to note that the result of the Court of Appeal’s judgment is that the taking of the photographs did not per se constitute a unlawful interference with Mr Wood’s right to privacy. Rather what was unlawful was the excessive retention of the photographs beyond a time when there was any reasonable basis for supposing that Mr Wood may engage in criminal conduct at the arms fair. On the question of whether this judgment sets a precedent on the question of whether the police can generally take photographs of ostensibly law-abiding citizens, it is worth noting Lord Collins’ concluding comments: ‘it is plain that the last word has yet to be said on the implications for civil liberties on the taking and retention of images in the modern surveillance society. This is not the case for the exploration of the wider, and very serious, human rights issues which arise when the State obtains and retains the images of persons who have committed no offence and are not suspected of having committed any offence’ (paragraph 100).

 

 

 

DNA Database – The Age of Innocence

May 7th, 2009 by Anya Proops

The Government has today proposed new rules for the retention of DNA profiles and fingerprints on the police national DNA database.  The proposals, which are made in the context of a public consultation process (‘Keeping the Right People on the DNA Database’), come in the wake of the Marper judgment (4 December 2008). In Marper, the ECtHR held that a blanket policy under which fingerprints, cellular samples  and DNA profiles were indefinitely retained by the police constituted a disproportionate and, hence, unlawful interference with Article 8 rights to privacy. The new proposed rules aim to circumvent the problems posed by having a blanket indefinite retention policy by varying the length of time that data can be retained depending in the innocence of the suspect and the severity of the crime in respect of which they were arrested. Thus, the DNA profiles and fingerprints of individuals who are arrested but not convicted in respect of minor offences will be destroyed after a period of six years; individuals who are arrested but not convicted for more serious violent and sexual offences and terrorism-related offences will have to wait twelve years for their DNA profiles and fingerprints to be destroyed; individuals who are convicted of an imprisonable offence will have their DNA profiles and fingerprints retained indefinitely. The proposals have received a rebarbative response from civil liberties campaigners, many of whom had expected the Government to destroy some 850,000 DNA profiles, fingerprints and samples in response to the Marper judgment. Of course, the question has to be posed whether it can ever be a proportionate interference with privacy rights to retain data in respect of individuals whose guilt was never established in respect of the offence for which they were arrested and who must, in the circumstances, be deemed innocent. The Government’s answer to this question appears to be that the interference is justified because: (a) criminology research suggests that, over time, the retained data can be used to convict those ostensibly innocent individuals of subsequent crimes; and (b) accordingly, retention of the data will constitute a vital weapon in the fight against crime. The presumption underlying this answer appears to be that, in a statistically significant number of cases, individuals who appear to be innocent in respect of one crime are in fact destined to go on to commit crimes in the future, such that it is legitimate for their data to be retained for a relatively substantial period of time (either six or twelve years). Whilst the more nuanced approach to the retention of DNA profiles may be relatively well placed to survive a legal challenge in the domestic courts (see further the House of Lords judgment in Marper [2004] UKHL 39, [2004] 1 WLR 2196), it remains to be seen whether the ECtHR would regard that approach as falling within the four corners of the justification defence under Article 8(2).

Super Database – Not so Super After All

April 29th, 2009 by Anya Proops

The Home Secretary has this week announced that proposals to create a State run super database, which would track everyone’s use of email, internet and text messages, have been scrapped. The announcement is hardly surprising. It was always going to be difficult to persuade the public that such a database could be kept secure, particularly in light of recent high profile controversies about large scale losses of electronic personal data by government agencies. Moreover, allowing the State to develop such a vast single repository of electronic communications data was always going to raise questions as to whether the resulting interference with private rights was proportionate and was otherwise consistent with the State’s obligations under the Data Protection Act 1998. The Government has now issued a consultation paper on new plans to allow telecommunications companies to retain the communications data for a period of 12 months. See further the Home Secretary’s Ministerial Statement.

Rethinking RIPA

April 20th, 2009 by Anya Proops

On 17 April 2009, the Home Office launched a consultation on plans to stop investigatory powers being used under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) for trivial purposes. It seeks views on questions including: which public authorities should be able to authorise key investigatory techniques, for example, the use of communications data or covert surveillance in public places under RIPA; the purposes for which these investigatory techniques should be used; the option of raising the rank of the local authority employee authorising the use of investigatory techniques to senior executive; and whether elected councillors should play a role in the authorisation. The consultation follows on from a spate of public outcrys about the use of surveillance powers by public authorities, including not least the use of covert cameras by local authorities to watch how residents use their rubbish bins and the use of covert surveillance techniques to track a family which the local authority suspected may be living outside the local school catchment area. The issue of how the investigatory powers available under RIPA should be used is particularly current in view of the recent controversy over techniques used by the police to photograph protesters, many of whom it is argued are merely peaceful demonstrators.

Google’s Streetview – ICO Responds

April 13th, 2009 by Anya Proops

The launch of Google’s Streetview service in March 2009 sparked considerable debate within the British media. Privacy campaigners criticised the intrusive nature of the service, which enables internet users to access 360 degree views of people, homes, cars and streets in 25 of Britain’s cities. It would appear that the Information Commissioner has now had his say on the matter. According to an article published in yesterday’s Observer newspaper, the Information Commissioner rejected a complaint brought by Privacy International which challenged the legality of the service. Notably, the Observer reports that the Commissioner dismissed the suggestion put forward by Privacy International that consent should have been sought from individuals whose image was captured in the pictures shown by Streetview. He apparently compared the Streetview service with images of individuals broadcast during televised football matches, where similarly consent would not be sought. Of course, Streetview is not the only part of Google’s operations which have given rise to privacy concerns. Not least in recent weeks, concerns have been raised about another Google innovation, which enables advertisers to target adverts on individual Google users by relying on  site-visit profiles developed by Google. The so-called behavioural targeting system enables Google to build up a profile of the internet sites visited by a particular user when using the Google search engine. The profile is then used as a basis for indicating what advertising the user may be interested in. Concerns expressed about the new system have included that individuals are not asked whether they wish to receive targeted advertising and, further, that the right to opt out of the system is not adequately advertised to users.

Guardian article on Streetview:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/apr/12/google-street-view-privacy

Channel 4 report on Behavioural Targetting System

http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/science_technology/how+google+adverts+got+personal/3076122

The Age of Internet Surveillance

April 6th, 2009 by Anya Proops

With effect from today, all UK internet service providers (“ISP”) will be required to retain data relating to every email which is sent and every online telephone call which is made using their services. The data, which must be stored by ISPs for 12 months, will not include the content of the email or the call. It will however include the date, time, duration and routing of the online communication as well as information as to the internet subscriber or user. The obligation to retain this data is imposed under the Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009 (“the Regulations”). The regulations were enacted in order to bring into effect the provisions of the Data Retention EU Directive 2006/24/EC. The Directive was itself enacted in response to concerns that a lack of consistency of approach to data collection across Europe, particularly in the field of internet communications, was hampering the fight against crime, including international terrorism. The effect of the Regulations, which come into force today, is that the data retention principles which already apply to telecoms providers under the Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2007 will now also apply to internet providers. As well as retaining the communications data, the internet service provider must afford access to particular data where they are required to do so by law (regulation 7). They must also abide by certain principles relating to the protection and security of the data (regulation 6).

A suitable case for recruitment

April 4th, 2009 by Timothy Pitt-Payne QC

 Information law overlaps with employment law in two main ways, in relation to employment vetting and employment monitoring. Broadly speaking vetting is about the enquiries that an employer can make before recruitment, and monitoring is about checking on the performance and behavior of existing employees.

 
The legal framework for employment vetting is changing radically, as the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 is brought into force. The Act implements the Bichard Report, which followed an inquiry into the notorious 2002 Soham murders. It establishes a new vetting and barring scheme for those working with children or vulnerable adults, to be operated by a statutory body called the Independent Safeguarding Authority (ISA).

 
With effect from 20th January 2009, the ISA was given responsibility for decision-making under the 3 existing employment barring lists: the education list, (popularly known as “List 99”), the PoCA list (for those working with children) and the PoVa list (for those working with vulnerable adults). As from 12th October 2009 these 3 lists will be replaced by two new lists introduced by section 2 of the 2006 Act and maintained by the ISA –  the children’s barred list and the adults’ barred list.  Employers, social services and professional regulators will have a duty to share information with the ISA. From July 2010, new entrants to roles working with vulnerable groups and those switching jobs within the sector will be able to register with the ISA, and employers will be able to check registration status online. The legal requirement for new entrants and those moving jobs to register with the ISA, and for employers to check on their status, will come into force by November 2010. The intention is to bring the whole of the existing workforce into the scheme by 2015.

 
I will be delivering a paper about employment vetting at the Local Government Group conference on 29th April, and the paper will be available on 11KBW’s website after the conference.  For consideration of whether the existing PoVA list is compatible with articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, see R (ota Wright) v Secretary of State [2009] UKHL 3.  For the timetable for implementing the 2006 Act, see here and here.

Big Brother Takes to the Road

March 31st, 2009 by Anya Proops

Many of us are aware that, when in use, our mobile phones can be used by telecoms companies and security agencies to trace our whereabouts. However, few of us are likely to have been contemplating a scenario where our cars would contain built-in tracking devices enabling state authorities to have, in effect, a system of near total road surveillance. However, a new EU backed project, known as the Cooperative Vehicle-Infrastructure Systems (CVIS) project, may go a long way towards achieving that result. In particular, it is understood that the project, which is due to be unveiled later on this year,  envisages that, by 2013, such devices would commonly be built into newly manufactured cars and that a universal frequency will be made available so as to enable state authorities to monitor the location of all cars fitted with the device. As one might expect, privacy and civil liberties groups are said to be up in arms about this development. It is understood that the European Data Protection Supervisor will make a formal announcement on the privacy implications of CVIS technology soon.

Media article:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/mar/31/surveillance-transport-communication-box