Information “reasonably accessible” despite hefty charge

January 31st, 2013 by Charles Bourne

In Davis v ICO and Health and Social Care Information Centre (case no. EA/2012/0175, judgment 24 January 2013) the First-Tier Tribunal applied the absolute exemption under section 21 of FOIA 2000 for information which is reasonably accessible to an applicant other than under section 1. The requested information consisted of health statistics which the public authority was willing to provide to the appellant under its publication scheme for a charge of £1,550. The appellant argued that the charge meant the information could not be considered to be reasonably accessible to a person of ordinary means.

 Section 19 of FOIA requires public authorities to adopt publication schemes, subject to approval by the Information Commissioner, for the dissemination of information with or without charge. Section 20 provides for the ICO to approve model publication schemes which public authorities may adopt without further approval.

 The critical provision in this case was section 21(3) which provides that information is “not to be regarded as reasonably accessible to the applicant merely because it is available from the public authority on request, unless the information is made available in accordance with the authority’s publication scheme and any payment required is specified in, or determined in accordance with, the scheme”.

 The Tribunal interpreted this provision as meaning that if a scheme has the ICO’s approval and if the charge is specified in the scheme or ascertainable from it, the ICO and the Tribunal are required – rather than merely empowered – to regard the information as reasonably accessible.

 There was therefore no scope for the ICO or the Tribunal to judge the accessibility of the information by reference to the charge or any other factor. The ICO’s approval of the model scheme was conclusive. The Tribunal was persuaded that the ICO is indeed the appropriate authority to determine whether access is reasonable, and that it was hard to see why Parliament should enact a detailed system for approval of publication schemes and notification of charges “if compliance simply made the authority`s published information eligible for an assessment as to whether it was reasonably accessible”.

 It seems that the only remedy for an applicant who is deterred by charges is to draw the matter to the ICO’s attention. The ICO is empowered to revoke his approval on notice and, as the Tribunal noted, might take such a step if there was evidence of charges deterring information requests.

 Charles Bourne

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Police Surveillance – New tribunal decision

June 20th, 2012 by Anya Proops

Earlier this month Robin Hopkins blogged on a recent admin court judgment applying Article 8 to the police’s act of retaining data on a protestor (see his post on the Catt case here). This week the Information Tribunal handed down a judgment concerning another aspect of police surveillance, namely the automatic number-plate recognition (ANPR) system, which is now in widespread use across Great Britain. In Mathieson v IC & Devon & Cornwall Constabulary (EA/2010/0174), Mr Mathieson, a Guardian journalist, requested disclosure from the Constabulary of the location of all the ANPR cameras within the area of the Devon & Cornwall Constabulary. The Constabulary refused disclosure on an application of ss. 24 (national security) and 31 (prevention of crime) FOIA. The Commissioner upheld the Constabulary’s refusal notice on the basis that the location information was exempt from disclosure under s. 31. Mr Mathieson appealed against the Commissioner’s decision.

At the hearing before the Tribunal, it was conceded on behalf of Mr Mathieson that, on all the evidence, both ss. 24 and 31 were engaged in respect of the location information. The key issue which the Tribunal was called upon to determine was whether the public interest balance nonetheless weighed in favour of disclosure. In summary, the Tribunal held that the use of the ANPR system by the Constabulary inevitably gave rise to serious civil liberty concerns. This was not least because the system indiscriminately recorded the number-plate of every single vehicle passing before the individual cameras, irrespective of whether the vehicles may be being used as part of a criminal enterprise or as a result of individuals innocently and lawfully going about their day to day business. However, it nonetheless went on to find that the public interest balance weighed firmly in favour of maintaining the exemptions. This was because, on all the available evidence, it was clear that revealing the location of the individual cameras within Devon and Cornwall would have enhanced the ability of criminals, including terrorists, effectively to bypass the ANPR system, thus helping them to evade detection and prosecution.

In the course of its decision, the Tribunal held that: ‘there is always likely to be a substantial public interest in maintaining the exemptions we are concerned with, in particular that provided by section 24 which relates to national security’ (§8). It also held that, whilst disclosure of the location information may only have tipped the balance slightly in favour of the criminals, not least because they may in any event have been able to identify the cameras through their own efforts, that was sufficient to result in a situation where the location information must be treated as exempt (§10).

Notably, a separate question was raised during the course of the appeal as to whether the information captured by the ANPR system amounted to ‘personal data’ in the hands of the Constabulary. Mr Mathieson and the Commissioner submitted that it did. The Constabulary disputed this conclusion. Ultimately, the Tribunal took the view that it did not need to resolve this dispute for the purposes of determining the appeal.

I am limited in what I can say about this case, having appeared on behalf of the Commissioner. However, it is clear from the judgment that there is an abiding issue as to the legality of the ANPR system and, in particular, whether it unjustifiably interferes with the right to privacy under Article 8 and/or with the data subject’s rights under the DPA. Whilst this is a nettle which the Tribunal itself considered it did not need to grasp in the circumstances of the Mathieson appeal, there can be little doubt but that it is a nettle which will be subject to judicial examination in the future.

Anya Proops

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PROTECTING CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION UNDER FOIA – NEW FTT DECISION

April 28th, 2012 by Anya Proops

The FTT has recently handed down a decision which considers in some detail the operation of s. 41(2) FOIA (exemption in respect of confidential information): Moss v IC & Home Office (EA/2011/0081). In Moss, a request was made for disclosure of a particular report prepared by IBM and provided to the Home Office. The report was compiled in circumstances where IBM was seeking to tender for provision to the Identity and Passport Service (IPS) of a biometric recognition system and was, as part of this process, considering which biometric software provider to partner with. The report sought to test the suitability of various biometric software providers and their products with a view to establishing which provider should be treated as the preferred provider in the context of the tender. IBM decided to provide the report to the IPS in order to build confidence in the solution that it was offering to the IPS as part of the tender process. The report was provided to the IPS in circumstances where there were various agreements in place which, whilst recognising the IPS’ obligations under FOIA, effectively obliged the IPS to treat the information it received from tenderers as confidential. Mr Moss submitted a request to the Home Office for disclosure of the report. The Home Office refused to disclose the report, relying on a number of exemptions including s. 41(2). The Commissioner concluded that the refusal was lawful on an application of s. 41(2). On appeal to the tribunal, Mr Moss sought to argue that the Commissioner had misapplied s. 41(2). In a lengthy judgment, a majority of the tribunal upheld the Commissioner’s decision. However, the minority held that the report ought to have been disclosed, subject to redactions to protect in particular the commercial interests of the software providers. The majority judgment is notable not least because of its emphatic approval of the test for breach of confidence adopted by Megarry J in Coco v Clark [1968] FSR 415. Other aspects of the majority judgment which are worthy of note include the majority’s conclusion that the public interest defence will not be available in respect of a potential claim for breach of confidence merely because the public has an interest in seeing the information in question (see in particular paras. 84 et seq).

Interestingly, both the majority and the minority touched on issues relating to the application of Article 10 in their respective judgments. The majority alluded to Article 10 in the context of highlighting the ways in which the Article 10 right to freedom of expression may bolster a prospective public interest defence against a claim for breach of confidence. (The existence of such a defence is relevant to the question whether, for the purposes of s. 41(2), disclosure of confidential information would give rise to an ‘actionable breach of confidence’). The minority, by way of contrast, alluded to the Article 10 right to receive information, which had recently been considered in the Sugar and Kennedy cases (in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal respectively). The minority queried whether and to what extent the recent jurisprudence on the Article 10 right to receive information ought to be shaping the analysis of the public interest defence under s. 41(2). See further my earlier post on the Kennedy judgment here.

Anya Proops

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UPDATE ON RECENT TRIBUNAL DECISIONS

January 11th, 2012 by Rachel Kamm

The First Tier Tribunal (Information Rights) has had a busy start to 2012, with 7 decisions on its website already.

The first judgment out was Herbert v ICO and West Dorset District Council, EA/2011/0157. The appellant sought correspondence concerning the transfer to the Council of property previously owned by Lyme Regis Borough Council. The Council refused the request on ground that it was vexatious. The history of this case related to incidents and disputes regarding a different matter, between the appellant and the Council dating back to 1992, which culminated in 1996 when the Council revoked a license held by the appellant. The ICO agreed that the request was vexatious. The appellant submitted that he had a genuine interest in the history of Lyme Regis and that he believed that some historical documents were missing from the National Archives and that they had been retained by the Council because they related to illegally acquired property. The Council had previously allowed him to research their archives on another matter and he wished to be able to do so again to look for these missing documents. He said that he had expected the ICO to contact him so that he could put forward further arguments. The FTT agreed with the ICO and the Council that the request had been made under FOIA (and not the EIRs). The FTT set out the key principles that have been applied by Tribunals in considering whether requests were vexatious under s14 FOIA. The FTT considered the background and found that the appellant’s request was obsessive. Further, the request had the effect of harassing the Council (even though the language was not hostile), as allegations of illegality and impropriety were made at the same time as the requests and there was a context of a high volume of correspondence. The Council had made extraordinary efforts to accommodate the appellant’s requests over a considerable period of time and valuable resources of time and effort have been used which could otherwise have been used more productively. In the view of the FTT, to accommodate this request would constitute a further and significant burden on the Council. The FTT concluded that the request was vexatious.

The next decision to be promulgated was King v ICO, EA/2010/0126. The appellant sought from the ICO records of complaints where Crawley Borough Council had failed to comply with FOIA/EIRs and the ICO never served a ‘decision notice’. The ICO refused the request on ground that the information  consisted of ‘third party information’ that was exempt from the requirements of disclosure. It did not identify the exemption relied on for refusing to disclose the information. However, it did provide the appellant with a summary of the information requested. Further information was provided by the ICO in response to the appellant’s request for a review of the decision. The appellant then asked for the information with just the personal details of individuals removed. The ICO refused, citing s.44 FOIA, as exempting information that is prohibited from disclosure under another Act, namely s.59 DPA (which prevents disclosure of information collected in the course of an investigation where there is no lawful authority to do so). The appellant requested  review of this decision. In subsequent correspondence, the ICO  relied on s.40 FOIA (the data protection exemption). The appellant then asked the ICO to make a decision under s.50 FOIA as to whether it had complied with the Act. Having previously been acting in its capacity as a body which was itself subject to FOIA, the ICO then changed back to its normal hat. The ICO said that it was reversing its decision and it provided the appellant with the  letters which had been sent to the Council in the cases alleging non-compliance with FOIA, with personal data redacted. The appellant disputed that this resolved his request; he also wanted the documents from the individuals making complaints and from the Council. The ICO denied that these had been within the scope of his original request. The ICO subsequently issued a decision notice stating that it had provided the appellant with the information requested, but that it had breached FOIA (including by not holding an internal review at the right stage, by not providing the information at the outcome of the internal review and by not acting within the time-scales in the Act). The appellant appealed, arguing that the ICO had not provided all information which fell within the scope of his request, had misinterpreted his request and had breached the duty to provide advice and assistance. In relation to the scope of the request, the FTT criticised the ICO for not having properly analysed the request but found that in fact it had provided all information that fell within the scope of the request. The appeal therefore failed. The FTT also found that the ICO was not in breach of the duty to provide advice and assistance; the appellant argued that the ICO should have asked him to clarify his request, but the FTT found that this was not necessary because the request was in any event clear and adequately specified the information sought. This case very much turned on its facts, but it is interesting to see the application of FOIA to the ICO as a public authority and it is also a useful reminder to carefully read the request from the outset.

The third decision out in 2012 was Newcastle Upon Tyne Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v ICO, EA/2011/0236. This appeal was struck out because the judge considered that there was no reasonable prospect of it succeeding. The disputed information was statistics about the number of people dismissed over a three year period. The Trust refused to provide the information, on ground that it was reasonably accessible (s.21 FOIA) by way of an application in the employment tribunal litigation. The Trust subsequently provided the information voluntarily. The ICO found that the Trust had misapplied s.21 FOIA. The Trust appealed, arguing that “The point at issue is one of prioritising the correct forum by which information is provided. The Trust point is that once proceedings are issued, the correct forum lies within the proceedings that have been issued, in this case the Employment Tribunal“. Not surprisingly, the judge found that this argument had no reasonable prospect of success. FOIA rights are not put on hold if there is litigation between the parties. Further, information obtained under FOIA can be used for any purpose whereas information obtained in litigation can only be used for that purpose and so litigation disclosure is not an answer.

Cross v ICO, EA/2011/025 is also a strike out decision. The appellant sought from Havant Borough Council a building control decision notice, plans and inspection records relating to a loft conversion to his home carried out in 1987. The Council refused the request under the EIRs, on ground that it was not held at the time of receipt of the request. The appellant believed that he had seen these documents on a visit to the Council and that, whilst it was possible that they had subsequently disappeared, his appeal should not be struck out. However, the Council had conducted a six day trawl for the information and the judge found that it was obviously willing to provide the information if it could be found. The appeal was therefore struck out as having no reasonable prospect of success.

Finally, in Martyres v ICO and NHS Cambridgeshire, EA/2011/020, the FTT dismissed an appeal by an appellant who sought all information held by NHS Cambridgeshire (and its relevant community services provider), in respect of her deceased mother who had died on 29 August 2009 including information about the care received by her mother at a care home she was staying at prior to her death. The appellant argued that she was the next of kin, proposed executor and trustee of one of the Wills and had a valid claim against her mother’s estate under the intestacy  rules. In relation to s.41 (FOIA), the FTT found that the information was obtained from another person (social care professionals), it possessed the necessary quality of confidence and disclosure would constitute such an actionable breach of confidence. The FTT further concluded that s.21 FOIA did not apply, in that the appellant would not have been able to obtain the disputed information under the Access to Health Record Act 1980 (as the appellant claimed); whilst she was the nearest relative, she was not the personal representative. The FTT also dismissed the appellant’s arguments under the Human Rights Act 1998.

Rachel Kamm

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CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARMS TRADE – SECTION 27

November 27th, 2011 by Rachel Kamm

The First Tier Tribunal (Information Rights) has been considering international relations in Campaign Against Arms Trade v Information Commissioner and Ministry of Defence, EA/2011/0109.

The Campaign Against Arms Trade contacted The National Archive by email on 22 May 2009 to request access to files held under reference nos. DEFE68/133 and DEFE68/136. File 133 was entitled or described as relating to the “[MOD]: Central Staff: Registered Files and Branch Folders: sale of arms to Saudi Arabia”. The file was said to be made up predominantly of “telegrams, memos and general correspondence to deal with the negotiations which took place during 1971/72 regarding the Saudi Arabian Air Defence Program (SADAP)”. File 136 was stated as dealing with the follow-up to the Saudi decision not to renew a contract for the training and maintenance of aircraft operated by the Royal Saudi Air Force with the British firm, Airwork, but to give it to the Pakistani Air Force instead.

The National Archive released the files with redactions and invoked section 27(1) and section 27(2) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA).  Section 27(1) provides that “Information is exempt information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice –(a) relations between the United Kingdom and any other State, (b) relations between the United Kingdom and any international organisation or international court, (c) the interests of the United Kingdom abroad, or (d) the promotion or protection by the United Kingdom of its interests abroad.” The MoD relied on (a), (c) and (d) of section 27(1). They also relied section 27(2), which provides that  “Information is also exempt information if it is confidential information obtained from a State other than the United Kingdom or from an international organisation or international court”. Both of these are qualified exemptions.

The Information Commissioner found that the exemptions in sections 27(1)(a), (c) and (d) and also section 27(2) were engaged. Having considered the balance of the public interest, he ordered limited disclosure of the previously redacted material. The appellant did not challenge this decision with respect to section 27(2) and therefore the Tribunal’s decision is only concerned with section 27(1).

The Tribunal considered the decision of Gilby v Information Commissioner and Foreign & Commonwealth Office (EA/2007/0071, 0078 and 0079).  The Tribunal commented that it was not bound by Gilby but that it was following the same general approach: “If corrupt activities on the part of UK officials are evident from the papers, as defined in paragraph 59 of the Gilby decision, there is a strong public interest in disclosure“. However, it had “real difficulty in applying a workable and justifiable approach to partial disclosure of documents through redaction“.

The Tribunal concluded that section 27(1) was engaged and that the Commissioner had properly applied the public interest considerations. It rejected the argument that, given the level and extent of disclosure in the wake of the Gilby decision and indeed in another context, disclosure of much although not all of the requested information would not necessarily lead to an unfavourable reaction on the part of Saudi Arabia.

Interestingly, the Tribunal commented on its approach where the parties have agreed to an appeal being determined on the papers without a hearing. Where the parties so consent, the Tribunal “is firmly of the view that it must therefore approach this appeal with a proper sense of proportion and also with a due sense and degree of proportionality. The costs which would be attendant on a more protracted exercise means that a minute dissection of what is a substantial body of information cannot properly be justified at least in the present case and the Tribunal so finds“. The parties should bear this comment in mind, when deciding whether or not to request an oral hearing of an appeal.

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THREE NEW PUBLIC AUTHORITIES SUBJECT TO FOIA

November 7th, 2011 by Robin Hopkins

The Freedom of Information (Designation as Public Authorities) Order 2011 came into force on 1st November 2011. It brings the following three public authorities within the scope of FOIA: the Associaton of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland (ACPO); the Financial Ombudsman Service and the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS).

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FROM NAKED PHOTOS TO NUCLEAR ENRICHMENT: ROUNDUP OF NEW TRIBUNAL DECISIONS

September 26th, 2011 by Robin Hopkins

The past week saw a slew of new decisions from the First-Tier Tribunal. Here is Panopticon’s highlights package.

Sections 41 (information obtained in confidence) and 43 (commercial prejudice)

In DBIS v IC and Browning (EA/2011/0044), the requester (a Bloomberg journalist) had sought information from the Export Control Organisation in connection with licences issued for the exporting to Iran of “controlled goods” – explained by the Tribunal as “mainly military, dual use (potentially military), equipment designed for torture or repression or sources of radio-activity”. The relevant public authority, the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, refused the request, relying on sections 41 and 43. The IC found for the requester on the narrow basis that, whilst disclosure would result in a breach of confidence, no commercial detriment would be suffered by the licence applicants as a result. Subsequent evidence from the Department persuaded the IC to change position and support the appeal, which was resisted by the applicant. In a decision which turned on the evidence, the Tribunal allowed the appeal, and found both sections 41(1) and 43(2) to be effective.

Section 42 (legal professional privilege)

Two recent decisions on this exemption. Both saw the Tribunal uphold the refusal, applying the established approach under which this exemption has a strong in-built public interest. Szucs v IC (EA/2011/0072) involved an FOIA request about an earlier FOIA request (the appellant requested the legal advice and associated documents provided to the Intellectual Property Office about how to deal with a previous FOIA request made by the appellant’s husband). Davis v IC and the Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery (EA/2010/0185) is eye-catching primarily because it concerned the Tate’s legal advice concerning the inclusion in an exhibition of a photograph of the actress Brooke Shields, aged ten, naked, entitled “The Spirit of America” (the Tate had initially proposed to include this in an exhibition, but ultimately withdrew the photograph).

Section 40 (personal data)

Beckles v IC (EA/2011/0073 & 0074) concerned the identifiability of individuals from small sample sizes, in the context of information about dismissals, compromise agreements and out-of-court settlements. The appellant asked Cambridge University for information on (among other things) the number of employees who received post-dismissal settlements. The answer was a low number. He asked for further details concerning the settlement amounts, rounded to some appropriate non-exact figure. This, said the Tribunal (applying the Common Services Agency/Department of Health approach to identifiability from otherwise anonymous figures) was personal data, the disclosure of which would be unfair. Its reasoning is summed up in this extract:

“Information as to the settlement of a claim made by an identified individual relating to his or her employment is undoubtedly personal data. The question is whether the four individuals or any of them could be identified if the information requested were disclosed, even in approximated form…. Cambridge University is made up of a large number of much smaller academic or collegiate communities. It is likely that a number of colleagues or friends will be aware that a particular individual settled a claim with the University within the time-scale specified. They will be aware of the general nature of that person`s employment. This is a small group of claims in a relatively short period. In the form originally requested it is readily foreseeable that one or more of the four will be identified.”

Sections 24 (national security) and 27 (international relations)

Burt v IC and MOD (EA/2011/0004) concerned information gathered by staff of the UK Atomic Weapons Establishment on an inspection visit to a United States atomic energy facility, as a learning exercise regarding the proposed development of an enriched uranium facility at Aldermaston. The US had expressed its desire to maintain proper confidence in what it regarded as a sensitive area. The MOD refused the request, relying on sections 27 and 24. By the time of the appeal, only a small amount of information had not been disclosed. This was primarily of a technical nature, containing observations about the operation of plant, machinery, procedures and processes at the US facility.

The Tribunal upheld the MOD and Commissioner’s case as regards the outstanding material. As regards section 27, the Tribunal applied the principles from Campaign against the Arms Trade v IC and MOD (EA/2006/00040). It observed, however, that confidential information obtained from another country would not always be protected by section 27: it was “perhaps axiomatic that the foreign State will take the United Kingdom as it finds it including but not limited to the effect of its own domestic disclosure laws. It follows that there may well be cases where information otherwise imparted in confidence from a foreign State to a United Kingdom authority would need to be considered on its own merits as to whether some form of disclosure should be made or ordered whether under FOIA or under similar analogous legislation or principles such as the UK data protection principles.”

As regards section 24, the Tribunal applied Kalman v IC and Department of Transport (EA/2009/0111) (recourse to the exemption should be “reasonably necessary” for the purpose of safeguarding national security), and Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2003] 1 A 153 (the threat to national security need not be immediate or direct).

Burt is also an example of a “mosaic effect” case: taken in isolation, the disputed information may appear anodyne, but the concern is with how it might be pieced together with other publicly available information.

Section 14(1) FOIA (vexatious requests)

Dransfield v IC (EA/2011/0079) is an example of the Tribunal overturning the Commissioner’s decision that section 14(1) had been engaged (for another recent example, see my post here). As with many such cases, the history and context were pivotal. Given that it is the request, rather than the requester, which must be adjudged to be vexatious, how should the context be factored in? The Tribunal gave this useful guidance:

“There is, however, an important distinction to be drawn between taking into account the history and context of a request, as in the cases referred to above, and taking into account the history and context of other requests made by a requester or other dealings between the requester and the public authority. The former is an entirely proper and valid consideration. The latter risks crossing the line from treating the request as vexatious, to treating the requester is vexatious. That line, in our view, was crossed in the present case.”

Robin Hopkins

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Launch of Information Law Reports

July 19th, 2011 by Rachel Kamm

 The Information Law Reports launched on 14 July 2011, with the following announcement on 11KBW’s website:

Leading chambers 11KBW and legal publisher Justis Publishing are collaborating in a first for both organisations: the creation of a new series of law reports available both in bound volumes from next week and on the established Justis platform from this morning.

Information law is ever more important, seeking to balance the “right to know” and the “right to be left alone” in an age of massive databases and global information flows. We all want to protect our own privacy; but we also want to understand how public authorities make decisions and spend our money. This new series will help professionals grapple with these issues.

Timothy Pitt-Payne QC, a barrister at 11KBW and one of the editors of the new reports, said: “There is a growing case-law, generated by the specialist Information Rights Tribunal and the higher courts. Navigating this material and quickly identifying the most important recent developments is increasingly challenging. The Information Law Reports seek to meet this need, bringing together all the most important cases in a single source. 11KBW are delighted to be working with Justis on this much-needed project.”

Masoud Gerami, Managing Director of Justis Publishing, said: “We have had a number of significant milestones in our 25-year history, mostly associated with innovation and developments which have changed legal information dissemination for the better. I am delighted that another milestone has been added to our list of achievements by producing the new series of Information Law Reports in association with 11KBW, the leaders in this increasingly important field. I believe that the complementary nature of the expertise from the partners in this project is the ideal requirement for any successful product or service, and we look forward to a continued relationship with 11KBW.”

He added: “This is also the first time that Justis Publishing has produced a product in hard copy, and we are very excited about the possibilities that the combination of hard copy and online versions will present.”

For further information, please call +44 (0)20 7267 8989 or email press@justis.com.

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PERSONAL DATA: CRUCIAL POINTS FROM THE ‘ABORTION STATISTICS’ CASE

June 14th, 2011 by Robin Hopkins

Judgment in Department of Health v IC [2011] EWHC 1430 (Admin) – the ‘abortion statistics’ appeal – was handed down on 20 April this year. Cranston J’s judgment has now been made available. The following salient points from that judgment may be of use to those interested in the concept and extent of ‘personal data’ under s. 40 FOIA and the DPA – especially when looking at the grey area of statistics or other anonymous data which is rooted in or derived from other data which is more overtly personal. The judgment is also essential reading for anyone grappling with the application of the leading House of Lords decision on this subject, Common Services Agency v Scottish Information Commissioner [2008] UKHL47, [2008] 1 WLR 1550 (‘CSA’). (‘Grappling’ is probably apt: even Cranston J conceded that “it would be wrong to pretend that the interpretation of the CSA case is an easy matter”).

Briefly by way of background: the Department refused a request for detailed statistics on the number of late-term abortions carried out on prescribed grounds. It relied on s. 40 FOIA, basing its case on the risk that, given the ‘low cell counts’ in these categories, the relevant patients and/or doctors might be identified by those sufficiently motivated to do so. The Commissioner found that these statistics were not personal data. The Information Tribunal agreed with the Department that they did constitute personal data, but was not satisfied that s. 40 was effective, as there was insufficient risk of identification.

On the Department’s appeal to the High Court, Cranston J agreed with the Commissioner that these statistics are not personal data.

One route to that conclusion was that advocated by the Commissioner, namely to adopt the approach of Baroness Hale in CSA: anonymised statistics remain personal data and therefore subject to the protection of the DPA in the hands of the data controller (who possesses the underlying data from which individuals could be identified) but not in the hands of the general public (who do not). This approach commended itself to the Upper Tribunal in the recent case of All Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition v Information Commissioner [2011] UKUT 153 AAC (on which, see my post here).

Cranston J, however, rejected that route, as it was the reasoning of Lord Hope rather than Baroness Hale in CSA which had attracted the majority’s support in that case. Lord Hope’s approach can be paraphrased as follows. The definition of personal data under s. 1 DPA provides for two means of identification: either from the data itself (inapplicable in the case of anonymous statistics) or from “from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is likely to come into the possession of, the data controller”. Lord Hope’s approach to situations such as this is to ask: does the ‘other information’ (if provided to the hypothetical member of the public) add anything to the statistics which would enable them to identify the underlying individuals? If the answer is no, the statistics are not personal data. The underlined words are important: if identification can be achieved from the ‘other information’ in isolation (rather than when added to the statistics) then the statistics themselves are truly anonymous, and are not personal data. The statistics in this case failed Lord Hope’s test, and were thus not personal data.

Cranston J’s conclusion was that the Tribunal had been correct to conclude that the data was ‘truly anonymised’ – but it had erred in treating this as personal data which had been truly anonymised. The Department contended that, because it held the underlying identification data, the abortion statistics remained personal data in all circumstances. Cranston J rejected this submission, stating that:

“If that were the case, any publication would amount to the processing of sensitive personal data…  Thus, the statistic that 100,000 women had an abortion in a particular year would constitute personal data about each of those women, provided that the body that publishes this statistic has access to information which would enable it to identify each of them.  That is not a sensible result and would seriously inhibit the ability of healthcare organisations and other bodies to publish medical statistics”.

In going on to dismiss the Department’s other grounds of appeal, Cranston J made a number of other points of general application. For example, in rejecting the criticism that the Tribunal had failed adequately to engage with the Department’s expert evidence, Cranston J said this:

“To begin, the issue before the Tribunal was one of assessment: the likelihood that a living individual could be identified from the statistics.  That was in my judgment only partly a question of statistical expertise, as regards matters such as the sensitivity of the data.  Partly, also, it was a matter of assessing a range of every day factors, such as the likelihood that particular groups, such as campaigners, and the press, will seek out information of identity and the types of other information, already in the public domain, which could inform the search.  These are factors which the Tribunal was in as good a position to evaluate as the statistical experts, a point which one of the Department of Health’s experts conceded.  The analysis also applies to the evidence of senior civil servants.”

As regards the Department’s contentions that conditions from Schedules 2 and 3 of the DPA were not met, their points were “wounding” to the Tribunal’s judgment, but not “fatal”, in light of the evidence at the Tribunal hearing. Finally, Cranston J described the Department’s argument based on Article 8 ECHR as “very much a jury argument”.

Interestingly, on the same day as judgment was given in this case, the High Court (Kenneth Parker J) gave judgment in R (BT & Anor) v The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2011] EWHC 1021 (Admin)  – BT’s unsuccessful application for judicial review of the Digital Economy Act 2010 (on which, see my piece here). One of the grounds of challenge was alleged non-compliance with the Data Protection Directive. In that judgment, IP addresses (anonymous strings of numbers linked to internet subscribers’ accounts) were treated as personal data even in the hands of copyright owners who possessed only those IP addresses. This was by application of the definition of personal data under the Directive: here copyright owners were deemed likely to come into possession of the underlying personal data when taking legal action against the individual internet subscribers who downloaded content in breach of copyright. This conclusion was reached independently of the Lord Hope test. Note, however, that it seems from the judgment that this question – are IP addresses always personal data or not – was not argued in full before Kenneth Parker J. There is talk of a potential appeal, so the application of these principles to IP addresses might be considered in the courts again before too long.

Robin Hopkins

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PERSONAL DATA, REPEAT AND VEXATIOUS REQUESTS AND INVESTIGATIONS

June 7th, 2011 by Rachel Kamm

In Jeffery Lampert v IC and Financial Services Authority EA/2010/0203, the appellant was involved in a long running dispute with a bank, which had called on his guarantee of a loan and commenced bankruptcy proceedings against him. His MP had raised the matter with the FSA and the appellant believed that this had led to at least one investigation of the bank. The appellant subsequently made a freedom of information request for information held by the FSA recording the outcome of investigations into the bank about the matter and the calculation of the bank’s loss. The Information Commissioner found that any information falling within the scope of the request was the appllant’s personal data and therefore absolutely exempt from disclosure under FOIA. The First-Tier Tribunal found that:

  • there had been no investigation by the FSA of the bank and there was no document in existence which contained a calculation of the bank’s loss;
  • any information falling within the scope of the request would not have been the appellant’s personal data; applying Durant, the Commissioner was wrong to decide, in effect, that, merely because the information requested arose from the appellant’s complaints, it all constituted his personal data;
  • the FSA was entitled to rely on section 14(1) FOIA, in that this was a repeat request and a reasonable interval had not elapsed since the previous substantially similar request; and, further
  • there was ample material from which it could be found that the appellant’s request was vexatious.

In Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland v IC and John Collins EA/2010/0109, Mr Collins requested the PPS documentation (excluding names and addresses) relating to a particular criminal damage case. It was not in dispute that section 30(1) FOIA was engaged and the only issue for the First-Tier Tribunal was whether the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighed the public interest in disclosure. The Tribunal accepted that it had to take into account the need for prosecutors to have a safe space in which to decide whether or not a case met the threshold for pursuing a prosecution, without fear of frank assessments being publicised after the event. Eroding this safe space would undermine the independence of prosecution authorities, compromise the quality of decision making, potentially deter witnesses from co-operating and undermine (without good reason) public confidence in those authorities. The Tribunal held that these factors attracted very substantial weight. The Tribunal found, having considered the disputed information, that there was no reason to suspect that the prosecuting authority had made substantial mistakes in this case. The public interest in maintaining the exemption therefore clearly outweighed the public interest in disclosure.

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